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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
cannot do directly.43 Thus there has been the counterplay of
the two interests, namely, that of safeguarding the taxpayer
from the costs of improper municipal contracts, as opposed




The majority of decisions place the municipality under the
same obligation to do justice as a private corporation where
there is not an abrogation of a public safeguard and hold that
wherever possible restitution in value should be made."5 Under
this principle municipal corporations, in part to protect the
credit of the municipality, like a private corporation or indi-
vidual, should be compelled to do justice and equity,"6 but only
within the bounds established to protect the municipality.
OIL AND GAS - SURVEY OF RIGHTS UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES
THE EXCEPTIONAL physical properties of oil and gas are re-
flected in the manner in which courts have created the law
which governs them. Recent developnients in the search of
oil and gas in North Dakota and the resultant leasing of oil,
gas and mineral rights in much of the state's real property
have led many property owners to attempt to classify the
legal rights of the parties arising under this special type of
lease.
43 Barnard v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N.E. 384 (1925) (protection of tax-
payers demanded strict construction); McCurdy v. Shiawassee County, 154
Mich. 550, 118 N.W. 625 (1908). See Village of Harvey v. Wilson, 78 Ill. App.
544 (1898) for an example of a statutory safeguard made meaningless.
44 The trend is toward allowance of quasi contract recovery in a greater num-
ber of situations. See Note, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 855, 858 (1938).
45 First Nat. Bank of Goodhue v. Village of Goodhue, 120 Minn. 362, 139 N.W.
599 (1913) (criticized in 16 Va. L. Rv. 628, 635 (1930) for allowing recovery
when loan was made without prior voter authorization required and also where
the president of the council was an official in the loaning bank). "As against in-
dividuals the law implies a promise to pay in such cases and the implication ex-
tends equally to corporations." San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal.
453 (1858). o
4s"Equity properly recognizes that a municipal corporation should not be
permitted to take the property of another, and receive the benefits thereof, and
thus be enriched through the loss of another without compensation." Bartelson
v. International School Dist., 43 N.D. 253, 256, 174 N.W. 78, 79 (1919). Accord:
Pimentel v. City of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351 (1863) ("The city is not excepted
from the common obligation to do justice which binds individuals"); Iverson
v. Williams School Dist., 42 N.D. 622, 172 N.W. 818 (1919).
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UNDERLYING LAW OF OIL AND GAS
Broadly speaking, the law of oil and gas is sui generis.1 In
the early cases the courts experienced much difficulty in giving
oil and gas a definite status as property and in attempting to
distinguish the rights of the landowner from his lessee's or
grantee's. Analogies were drawn from the rules relating to
animals ferae naturae,2 underground water, solid minerals,
and even air. Because oil and gas when in situ have few migra-
tory tendencies but still may escape without the volition of the
surface owner, it was natural that confusion would result in
classifying oil and gas as property. In the famous Pennsyl-
vania case of Westmoreland v. DeWitt 3 the early theory that
the property owner had absolute dominion over the oil and
gas underlying his land, 4 developed from the idea that oil and
gas were part of the total aggregate of the land, gave way to
the better view that the owner of the surface lost his right to
the oil and gas if they escaped into the land of another, and
the landowner only acquired absolute control when the oil and
gas were actually brought within his grasp and into his pos-
session on the surface.
5
LEGAL INTERESTS CREATED BY LEASES IN GENERAL
In the ordinary lease for production the owner does not en-
tirely divest himself of his rights to gas and oil under his land.
The legal effect of each individual lease is, of course, governed
by the intent of the parties as drawn from the terminology
used. If the landowner completely divests himself of his rights,
the lessee receives all legal interest that the original landowner
had in the land.6 But where something is retained, courts have
run the gauntlet in arriving at their conclusions as to what
legal interests have been created by oil and gas leases, finding
the rights to be in the nature of a profit a prendre,7 an incor-
1 Colby, Tke Law of Oil and Gas, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 357 (1943).
2 Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889); Colby,
supra note 1, at 261.
a 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889).
4 This theory is exemplified by the early case of Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa.
324, 27 Atl. 714 (1893).
5 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
6 See Sommers, Oil and Gas. 9§38, 39 (1927).
7 Funk v. Halderman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866). A profit a prendre is a right exercised
by one man in the soil of another, accompanied with participation in. the profits
of the soil. A right to take part of the soil or produce of the land, it is considered
an interest or estate in the land itself. Gadow v. Hunholtz, 160 Wis. 293, 151
N.W. 810 (1915).
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poreal hereditament," an estate in land,9 not an estate in land,10
a freehold," a tenancy at will,12 a servitude,3 a chattel real, 1"
real estate,15 an interest in land," not an interest in land, 7 and
personal property.' s The basic principle on which the lease for
production lies today is that the lessee has, merely a license
to explore, conveying no interest in the land, and the lease is
looked upon as an incorporeal hereditament and as personal
property. 9
Thus, in some jurisdictions, the lease passes no present
title of any kind whatsoever, 20 but other courts have stated
that as the prime object of an oil and gas lease is the extrac-
tion of the subsurface oil and gas for the parties' mutual bene-
fit, the lessee is vested with a qualified or determinable fee.2 '
Generally, if the lease is for a fixed period of years, it may be
regarded as a chattel real, but if it is capable of infinite dura-
tion it assumes the nature of a freehold or defeasible fee, and
vests in the lessee a present interest in the land in the nature
of a profit a piendre in gross, although it does not pass title
to oil and gas in place in the ground.2 2 When the oil and gas
lease amounts to little more than a license to explore, and al-
though contemplating the vesting of a conditional estate in
the lessee in the event of discovery of oil and gas within the
time specified, passes no present title of any kind, the lessee
gains the right of ingress and egress from the land, the right
to produce oil and gasi when once found, but gets no vested
rights until oil and gas is discovered.2 8 This is the normal lease
for production.
LEASES FOR PRODUCTION AND GRANTS OF MINERAL RIGHTS
The distinction between the ordinary lease for production
and the grant or reservation of a mineral right in the land
s Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902).
9 Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S.W. 169 (1902).
10 Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okla. 92, 124 Pac. 291 (1912).
11 Daughtee v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 Il1. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909).
12 Knight v. Ind. Coal and Iron Co., 47 Ind. 103 (1874).
is Frost Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sallings Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
14 Duff v. Keaton, 83 Okla. 92, 124 Pac. 291 (1912).
15 Columbian Oil Co. v. Blake, 13 Ind. App. 680, 42 N.E. 234 (1895).
is Montana & W. Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 Pac. 784 (1911).
17 Nat. Gas and Oil Co. v. Matolock, 177 Iowa 225, 97 N.W. 787 (1912).
s Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501, 62 N.E. 584 (1902).
'9 Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 Kan. 147, 40 P.2d 46S (1935).
20 Huggins v. Daly, 99 Fed. 606 (4th Cir. 1900).
21 Leonard v. Prater, 36 s.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
22 Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emerson, 298 11. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921).
28 Huggins v. Daly, 99 Fed. 606 (4th Cir. 1900).
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should be noted. In general, a conveyance of minerals, or a
reservation of the mineral rights in land transferred, includes
the oil and gas.24 If the reservation retained by the transferor
or the mineral right given to the grantee assumes the form of
a "royalty," a real obligation is imposed on the land, and is a
species of real right running with the land.25 In Oklahoma, a
conveyance of oil and gas and other mineral rights in and
under the land is a conveyance of an interest in the land itself
and creates a separate estate therein.26 Such a right would
be considered a vested right.27 Following the general rule that
oil and gas are looked upon as minerals, a reservation of
minerals only in a deed includes oil and gas, at least where
at the time of the execution of the deed oil and gas are being
developed in the viciity.28 A deed must contain language that
expressly excludes oil and gas if a general deed of minerals
is granted; otherwise the general rule will apply.
29
ROYALTY RIGHTS
Royalty rights have been given different interpretations by
the courts. While a royalty is the consideration for the rights
and privileges granted to the lessee and consists of the right
to share in any minerals discovered, 0 the right to a royalty be-
comes vested only when the oil or gas, or other mineral be-
comes captive and reduced to personal property. Therefore it
would appear that when oil and gas remain in the ground in
place as realty, they would not be included in the term royalty,
although a royalty is an interest in real estate entitling the
owner to a share of the productilon.- Royalty'refers not to the
oil in place, but is the compensation paid for the privilege of
drilling and producing and does not include a perpetual inter-
est in the oil and gas in the ground. 2 On the other hand, the
24 Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73 (1949).
25 Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 208 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1949).
26 Cornelius v. Jackson, 209 P.2d 166 (Okla. 1948), cert. dented, 335 U.S. 906
(1949); Martin v. Atkinson Warren & Henley Co., 195 Okla. 19, 154 P.2d 945
(1945).
27 Burke v. Southern Pacific Ry., 234 U.S. 669 (1914); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U.S. 190 (1900); Walks v. Midland Calrbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920).
28 Barker v. Campbell-Radcliff Land Co., 64. Okla: 249, 167 Pac. 468 (1917).
29 Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 2.54 S.W. 345. (1923); Hudson v.
MaGuire, 188 Ky. 712, 223 S.W. 1101 (1920);.14tirray v. ,Allred, 100 Tenn. 100, 43
SiW. 355 (1897).
80 See Note, 90 A.L.R. 770 (1934).
5' Hulse v. Hulse, 155 Ill. App. 343 (1910)4 Pjklmer v. Crews, 35 So2d 240
(Miss. 1948).
32 Bellport v. IXtrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255. Pac. 52 (1927).
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mineral interest is an interest in the oil and gas in place and
constitutes an actual interest in real estate, 3 and may or may
not produce royalties under the lease. In case the property
owner grants the right to enter and explore and as his con-
sideration takes a certain fractional interest in the form of
royalties if minerals are discovered, it must be remembered
that the concept of royalty always presupposes development
or production of the mineral to which it relates.3' The term
royalty is generally applied in the oil industry to the fractional
interests in production of oil and gas which are created by
the owner of the land either by reservation when an oil and
gas lease is entered into or by a direct grant to a third person. 8
It would seem that the essential difference between the sale of
a royalty interest and the sale of a mineral in land leased for
minerals, is that the purchaser of the royalty interest receives
nothing under the lease unless profitable production is ob-
tained, whereas the purchaser of a mineral interest unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary is entitled to receive his
proportionate part of the renewal rentals under the lease and
a like proportion of the price of subsequnt lease renewals paid
thereunder."1 As oil and gas lose their character of real prop-
erty when produced and marketed, they become the- property
of the owner of the well. 7 It follows that where land subject to
an oil and gas lease is subdivided and sold, the royalties from
a producing well belong to the owner of the tract on which
the well is drilled.
CONCLUSION
The property owner should remember that it is within his
power to divide his land horizontally as well as vertically in
such a manner that title to the surface may rest in one per-
son, but title to the oil and gas or other minerals and the right
to extract them, in another."8 Once they are extracted, they be-
come personal property subject to the law of personal prop-
erty. The general rule is that the lessee under an oil and gas
86 Holland v. Shaffer, 162 Kan. 474, 178 P.2d 235 (1947).
84 McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W.Va. 355, 28 S.E.2d 95 (1948).
85 La Leguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal.2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941); Confer
Belgam Oil Co. v. Wirt Franklin Petroleum Co., 209 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ App.
1948). See Note, 135 A.L.R. .546 (1941).
86 Bennett v. Robinson, 25 So.2d 641 (La.App. 1946).
87 Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897).
88 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
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lease owes to his lessor an obligation to exercise reasonable
diligence in drilling an exploratory well, in the operation of
the well, and in protecting the deposit against drainage.8 9 The
North Dakota court, in the recent case of Herman Hanson Oil
Syndicate v. Benz,4 0 appears to have taken the point of view
that the obligation to drill the exploratory well with reason-
able diligence is to be construed equitably and the lease will not
be considered abandoned through failure to drill a started well
to completion where extrinsic reasons halt operations.
8s See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, c. 2 (2d ed. 1940) ; 23
Tex.L. Rev. 137 (1945).
4o 40 N.W.2d 304 (N.D. 1949).
